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USE IMMUNITY ADVISEMENTS AND THE PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE'S ASSERTION OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
Over the past two decades, United States federal and state courts have
struggled to reconcile the conflict between a public employee's right against
compelled self-incrimination' and a government employer's right to question
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself". Id. The fifth amendment's guarantee against compelled self-incrimination applies to
state actions through the fourteenth amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8
(1964) (protection of fifth amendment applies to state action through fourteenth amendment
due process clause); U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV. (no state shall deprive a person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law). Historically, the United States Supreme Court has
construed the fifth amendment liberally to serve the purposes of the amendment. See, e.g.,
Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) (hostile and niggardly interpretation of
fifth amendment is improper); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892) (fifth
amendment must have broad construction); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)
(strict and literal construction of fifth amendment privilege leads to unacceptable deterioration
of right).
The Supreme Court has articulated several central purposes which guide the Court's
interpretation of the fifth amendment. First, the Supreme Court has noted that accusatorial
criminal justice systems are favored over inquisitorial systems. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). Second, confronting a subject of questioning with the choice between
self-incrimination, perjury, or contempt is offensive. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637
(1896) (Field, J., dissenting). Third, authorities might use improper practices to coerce testimony
in the absence of the fifth amendment privilege. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55. Finally, the Supreme
Court has noted that coerced statements generally are unreliable sources of evidence. Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1974).
The underlying policies and the liberal construction of the fifth amendment have
produced non-literal definitions for key phrases within the text of the fifth amendment. For
fifth amendment purposes, "persons" include all natural individuals. United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944); see Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (fifth amendment
protection applies to all individuals, including public employees); see also Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85, 95 (1974) (partnership cannot claim fifth amendment privilege); George
Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 289 (1968) (corporation cannot claim fifth
amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944) (labor union cannot
claim fifth amendment privilege). Compulsion entails any official coercion to respond to
questions after invoking the fifth amendment privilege. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S.
181, 187 (1977); see Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (physical and mental
coercion may constitute compulsion for fifth amendment purposes). A "criminal case" under
the fifth amendment involves any proceeding in which answers to questions might tend to
incriminate the witness in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951). Being a witness against oneself encompasses giving testimony or
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 761 (1966) (evidence pertaining to physical characteristics of witness obtained by blood
test not testimonial or communicative in nature). See generally Arenella, Shmerber and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 Aii. Cram. L. Rav. 31 (1982) (discussing
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employees on matters related to the employee's official duties. 2 Several
United States Supreme Court decisions have established the concept of use
immunity3 and have created guidelines that preserve the rights of a public
impact of modern Supreme Court decisions on scope of fifth amendment); Friendly, The Fifth
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case For Constitutional Change, 37 U. CiN. L. REv. 679 (1968)
(reexamining purposes and policies of fifth amendment); McKay, Self-Incrimination and the
New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. RFv. 193 (discussing problems in fifth amendment law arising
from modern interpretations of privilege against self-incrimination).
2. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84 (1973) (state may force employee or public
contractor to answer questions when state offers immunity sufficient to supplant fifth amend-
ment privilege); Navy Pub. Works Center v. FLRA, 678 F.2d 97, 102 (9th Cir. 1982) (employer
has right to require employee to account for performance of employee's duties); Clifford v.
Shoultz, 413 F.2d 868, 876 (9th Cir.) (employer has right to demand answers from employee
on matters of national security), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 962 (1969).
3. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (use immunity is coextensive
with scope of fifth amendment privilege); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., 378 U.S. 52, 79
(1964) (use immunity necessary when government compels testimony); Counselman v. Hitch-
cock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892) (federal statute must supply immunity from use of evidence
that is fruit of compelled testimony). Immunity provisions and the fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination have had a long and intimate relationship. The United
States Supreme Court's first encounter with a federal immunity statute enacted to supplant
the fifth amendment privilege came in Counselman v. Hitchcock. Counselman, 142 U.S. 547
(1892). In Counselman, a federal district court found a witness in contempt because the witness
refused to answer questions before a grand jury. Id. at 552. The witness claimed the fifth
amendment privilege and challenged a federal immunity statute on the ground that the statute
did not provide the witness with protection sufficient to satisfy the fifth amendment. Id. The
Supreme Court invalidated the federal immunity statute because the statute did not provide
the witness protection from the subsequent use of evidence derived from the testimony that
the witness gave under the compulsion of the federal immunity statute. Id. at 586.
The Supreme Court confronted a revised immunity statute in Brown v. Walker. Brown,
161 U.S. 591 (1896). In Brown, a federal district court found a witness in contempt because
the witness refused to answer questions before a grand jury. Id. at 593. The witness asserted
the fifth amendment privilege and challenged the federal immunity statute. Id. The witness
claimed that the fifth amendment prohibited the use of any immunity provision to compel
testimony over a valid assertion of the fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 595. The Supreme
Court, however, upheld the use of the federal immunity statute that provided complete amnesty
from prosecution related to the acts about which the witness testified and that provided
derivative-use immunity to the compelled testimony. Id. at 608. The Supreme Court, therefore,
confined the protection of the fifth amendment strictly to criminal prosecution consequences.
Id. The federal immunity statute in Brown provided the witness with "transactional immunity".
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, courts held that
transactional immunity was required to supplant the fifth amendment privilege. Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). In Murphy, the Supreme Court found that the
fifth amendment demanded protection from only the use of a witness' testimony and the use
of any evidence derived from the witness' testimony. Id. at 79. Use immunity, therefore,
became the standard of immunity to displace a claim of the fifth amendment privilege, and
transactional immunity became defunct. Id. Since the decision in Murphy, the Supreme Court
firmly has upheld federal and state use immunity statutes. See Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (upholding federal use immunity statute); Zicarelli v. New Jersey, 406
U.S. 472, 475 (1972) (upholding state use immunity statute). The Supreme Court appears
resolute in demanding only use immunity because use immunity essentially gives the witness
the same status with respect to future criminal proceedings as if the witness had remained
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employer and a government employee without significant damage to either
right.4 When government authorities question a public employee, the em-
ployee has the right to claim the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.5 An employee's assertion of the fifth amendment privilege is
valid without regard to the circumstances in which government officials
question the public employee.6 An employee, however, must assert his fifth
amendment right affirmatively.7 Furthermore, to assert the privilege prop-
erly, the employee must have a reasonable belief that his answers to the
employer's questions might incriminate the employee in a subsequent crim-
inal proceeding.8 An employer may not take disciplinary action against a
silent. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (use immunity gives witness who testifies under compulsion
identical status with respect to future criminal prosecution as witness who remains silent and,
therefore, is sufficent to supplant fifth amendment privilege).
4. See infra notes 5-14 and accompanying text (discussing legal guidelines for public
employers conducting investigative interview with public employee).
5. See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284-
85 (1968) (public employee may claim fifth amendment privilege in employment disciplinary
proceeding); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968) (public employee's assertion of
fifth amendment privilege is proper in employment disciplinary proceeding); Spevack v. Klein,
385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) (state cannot extend fifth amendment privilege to some individuals
and not to others).
6. See Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449, 464 (1975) (fifth amendment applies to any
proceeding); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (fifth amendment privilege
applies to any proceeding); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967) (propriety of asserting fifth
amendment privilege does not depend upon nature of proceedings but upon nature of questions
and risk of self-incrimination); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (fifth amendment
applies whenever answer might subject witness to appreciable risk of criminal responsibility).
7. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980) (individual must invoke fifth
amendment privilege to enjoy protection from self-incrimination); United States v. Mandujano,
425 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1976) (fifth amendment protection does not exist unless witness
affirmatively asserts privilege); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1976) (providing
information without asserting fifth amendment privilege relinquishes right to claim fifth
amendment protection from use of that information as evidence in subsequent criminal
proceedings); Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975) (fifth amendment privilege does not
operate unless witness claims privilege); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951)
(answering incriminatory question without invoking of fifth amendment privilege bars later
assertion of fifth amendment as to that answer). See generally, Note, Testimonial Waiver of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 HARv. L. Rav. 1752 (1979) (discussing consequences
of failing to invoke fifth amendment privilege properly before offering answers to incriminating
questions).
8. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972)
(fifth amendment does not permit witness to remain silent when dangers of incrimination are
remote and speculative); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951) (asserting
fifth amendment privilege is reasonable when setting and implications of question indicate that
answer is potentially injurious); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896) (fifth amendment
does not help witness avoid remote dangers of self-incrimination); Johnston v. Herschler, 669
F.2d 617, 619 (10th Cir. 1982) (danger of discharge from employment alone is not basis for
reasonable assertion of fifth amendment privilege); Childs v. McCord, 420 F. Supp. 428, 434
(D. Md. 1976) (fifth amendment does not apply to disciplinary proceedings when no risk of
subsequent criminal prosecution exists), aff'd sub nom. Childs v. Schlitz, 556 F.2d 1178 (4th
Cir. 1977).
1987]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:259
public employee for claiming the privilege against self-incrimination.9 A
public employer also may not discipline an employee for refusing to waive
immunity from the use of the employee's compelled statements, or evidence
derived from the employee's statements, in a criminal prosecution of the
employee.10
If an employer succeeds in compelling an employee to speak, the
employee's statements, and any evidence derived from the employee's state-
ments, are not admissable as evidence against the employee in a subsequent
criminal proceeding." In non-criminal disciplinary hearings, however, a
public employer may use evidence that the government obtains from an
employee's coerced testimony. 2 If an employer is unable to compel an
employee to answer questions, an employee might frustrate the employer's
efforts to obtain information from the employee on employment-related
matters. The Supreme Court has sought to remedy this situation by allowing
a public employer to dismiss a public employee for failing to answer
questions "specifically, directly, and narrowly" related to an employee's
official duties, provided the employer does not coerce the employee to waive
use immunity. 3 An employer, however, may not discipline an employee for
refusing to answer non-duty-related questions.'
4
9. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956) (discharge of
public employee for asserting privilege against self-incrimination violates fifth amendment).
10. See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284
(1968) (city could not fire sanitation men for refusing to sign waiver of immunity from use
of testimony in criminal proceeding when city attempted to compel testimony from sanitation
men over fifth amendment objections); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968) (city
could not discharge police officers for refusing to sign waiver of immunity with respect to
testimony before grand jury investigating bribery and corruption); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S.
511, 514 (1967) (ruling that state cannot disbar attorney for asserting fifth amendment right
at disciplinary proceeding); infra text accompanying notes 56-61 (discussing Supreme Court's
decision in Uniformed Sanitation Men); infra text accompanying notes 31-38 (discussing
Gardner).
11. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (state could not use testimony
as evidence in subsequent criminal proceeding when testimony obtained through threat of
dismissal); infra text accompanying notes 21-30 (discussing Garrity).
12. See Confederation of Police v. Conlisk, 489 F.2d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 1973) (public
employer may dismiss employee on basis of information gained from compelled answers to
duty-related questions), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974); Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279,
284 (7th Cir.) (removal of Illinois state circuit court judge based on immunized testimony
given before grand jury did not violate fifth amendment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037 (1972);
Childs v. McCord, 420 F. Supp. 428, 436 (1976) (state licensing board's use of immunized
testimony in disciplinary proceeding does not violate fifth amendment), aff'd sub nom. Childs
v. Schlitz, 556 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1977); Bowes v. Comm'n to Investigate Allegations of
Police Corruption, 330 F. Supp. 262, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (public employer may use testimony
compelled by use immunity as basis for dismissing police officer).
13. See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968) (employer may discharge public
employee who refuses to answer duty-related questions if employer does not compel waiver of
immunity); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284
(1968) (employer may discharge public employee who refuses to answer duty-related questions
if employer does not compel waiver of immunity); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 519 (1967)
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Federal and state courts have established basic guidelines governing an
investigative interview of a public employee in an attempt to balance the
competing rights of the public employer and the public employee.'- In a
further effort to balance the competing rights of an employer and an
employee, several federal and state courts have demanded that a public
employer advise a public employee regarding the status of the employee's
use immunity before the employer may discipline the employee for refusing
to answer duty-related questions.16 Other state and federal courts, however,
expressly have rejected the advisement requirement. 17 Although the Supreme
Court has not addressed the advisement requirement, 8 the Supreme Court
(Fortas, J., concurring) (employer may discharge public employee who refuses to account for
his public trust if employer does not compel waiver of immunity). Compare Gulden v.
McCorkle, 680 F.2d 1070, 1076 (5th Cir. 1982) (questions about employee's role in bomb
threat directed at employer's offices are duty-related questions); Obrien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d
543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976) (questions about policeman's finances are duty-related questions), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Clifford v. Shoultz, 413 F.2d 868, 876 (9th Cir.) (when government
requires security clearance for employment, questions about affiliation with Cuban Communists
are duty-related questions), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 962 (1969); McLean v. Rochford, 404 F.
Supp. 191, 198 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (questions about whether employee observed another employee
engaged in sexual intercourse with minor while on duty are duty-related questions); Marks v.
Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373, 1377-78 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (when government requires security
clearance for employment, questions about whether employee engaged in homosexual conduct
are duty-related questions); and Marsh v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 64 Ohio App. 2d 151, 157,
411 N.E.2d 803, 808 (1977) (questions about fireman's role in false alarm are duty-related
questions); with Confederation of Police v. Conlisk, 489 F.2d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1973) (questions
about whether policeman invoked fifth amendment privilege at grand jury hearing are not
duty-related questions), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974); and Slevin v. City of New York,
551 F. Supp. 917, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (questions about policeman's personal finances are not
duty-related questions).
14. See Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. 917, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (government
may not discipline public employee for refusing to answer questions unrelated to employee's
official duties); cf. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 517 (1967) (government investigatory body
cannot compel production of documents in disbarment proceeding that are unrelated to
performance of attorney's official duties).
15. See supra notes 5-14 and accompanying text (discussing legal guidelines for public
employer conducting investigative interview with employee).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 55-77 (discussing cases holding that fifth amend-
ment demands use immunity advisement before employer may discipline public employee for
refusing to answer duty-related questions).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 78-109 (discussing cases holding fifth amendment
does not require use immunity advisement before public employer may discipline employee for
refusing to answer luty-related questions).
18. See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 627
(2d Cir. 1970) (confirming that Supreme Court has not addressed use immunity advisement
issue), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972). Although the United States Supreme Court has not
answered directly the question of whether a public employer must give grants or advisements
of use immunity, Supreme Court decisions contain language suggesting that employers should
satisfy a use immunity advisement requirement before disciplining an employee. See Maness
v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1975). In Maness v. Myers, the United States Supreme Court
overturned a lawyer's contempt conviction for advising his client not to produce documents
subsequent to a subpoena duces tecum which the attorney believed would incriminate his client.
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in Garrity v. New Jersey 9 and Gardner v. Broderick20 has developed fifth
Id. at 470. The Supreme Court stated in dicta that if the client produced the documents, the
client would receive use immunity, and in any criminal proceeding the client could move to
suppress the evidence on fifth amendment grounds. Id. at 461-62. The Supreme Court in
Maness, however, noted that the client's subsequent ability to suppress the evidence was
insufficient to satisfy the scope of the fifth amendment protection against compelled self-
incrimination. Id. at 461-62. The Court noted that the fifth amendment demanded additional
protection in the form of a grant of use immunity. Id. at 462 n. 10. Thus, the mere existence
of immunity from the use, or derivative use, of testimony compelled over fifth amendment
objections also might be insufficient to satisfy the witness' fifth amendment rights. The
additional protection that the Supreme Court in Maness Court implied was necessary may be
the use immunity advisement when a public employee asserts his fifth amendment privilege,
despite the fact that the employee automatically has use immunity as a result of any sanction
the employer may threaten for the employee's refusal to answer duty-related questions. See
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (use immunity automatically arises from
coercion inherent in policy of dismissal from employment for refusing to answer duty-related
questions).
The Supreme Court's statement in dicta in Maness that laymen may not be cognizant of
the exact scope of the fifth amendment privilege further supports the proposition that the fifth
amendment requires a use immunity advisement. Maness, 419 U.S. at 466. The Court implied
that a public employer must give some advisement to an employee concerning the employee's
fifth amendment rights because an employee presumably does not have, nor should an employer
expect him to have, a full knowledge of the consequences of his acts or his employer's acts.
Id. The Court also noted that the fifth amendment is not "self executing" because a witness
affirmatively must assert the fifth amendment privilege to enjoy the amendment's protection.
Id. Because an employee has the duty to make an affirmative assertion of his fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination, an employer might have the similar duty affirmatively to advise
the employee of the attachment of use immunity to the employee's compelled statements before
the employer may discipline the employee for refusing to answer duty-related questions.
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has cautioned the government that the
government must grant or offer immunity before the government may compel a witness'
testimony over a claim of the fifth amendment privilege. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham,
431 U.S. 801, 809 (1977) (once state grants use immunity, state may compel testimony); United
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976) (witness has duty to testify when state grants
immunity); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1975) (if state compells testimony, state
must offer immunity to witness); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 79, 85 (1973) (state must
grant or offer immunity to witness before state can compel testimony); Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (grant of use immunity is coextensive with fifth amendment
protection); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 (1956) (state may compel testimony
if state grants immunity sufficient to remove witness' reasonable fear of criminal prosecution).
The Supreme Court's references to grants and offers of immunity suggest that state and federal
officials affirmatively must act to provide immunity to a witness. The Supreme Court, therefore,
implies that an employer must give an employee an advisement concerning use immunity. The
government should not rely on the fact that use immunity automatically arises from compulsion
to speak over fifth amendment objections.
Supreme Court opinions also contain language which supports rejection of the use
immunity advisement requirement. In Brown v. Walker, one of the Supreme Court's earliest
fifth amendment controversies, the Court asserted that the fifth amendment does not protect
witnesses who claim the fifth amendment privilege on the basis of naked and remote chances
that the government might use the witness' compelled testimony in subsequent criminal
proceedings. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896). Because no chance that an employer
may use an employee's compelled statements in a later criminal proceeding exists, a public
employee, therefore, may not complain that the lack of a use immunity advisement causes the
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amendment law governing public employers' interrogation of public em-
ployees.
In Garrity v. New Jersey, the State of New Jersey convicted two police
officers of conspiring to obstruct justice.21 At trial, the State had used
testimony that the police officers gave in a previous investigation by the
Attorney General of New Jersey.? Before questioning the police officers,
representatives of the Attorney General had advised the officers that the
State could use an employee's statements against the employee in a criminal
proceeding.? The State also had informed the officers that an employee
could remain silent by asserting the fifth amendment privilege, but that the
State would discharge the employee from employment if the employee
refused to answer questions. 24 The officers answered questions, but objected
to the State's use of the answers in criminal proceedings against the officers?21
In reversing the conviction of the officers, the Supreme Court concluded
that the officers' statements were not voluntary. 26 The Supreme Court,
therefore, held that the officers' statements were inadmissable as evidence
against the officers in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 27 The Supreme
Court reasoned that the officer's statements were not voluntary because the
State's requirement that the employees answer questions or face dismissal
fifth amendment to prohibit discipline of the employee for refusing to respond to duty-related
questions. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (state may not use compelled
testimony against witness in subsequent criminal proceedings).
The interpretation applied to the Supreme Court's statements in Brown also applies to
statements made in other Supreme Court decisions. In Hale v. Henkel, the Supreme Court
asserted that once the risk of criminal sanction ceases to exist, the fifth amendment does not
offer protection to a witness. Hale, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906). Because the Supreme Court in
Garrity v. New Jersey held that the fifth amendment automatically confers use immunity when
an employer compels an employee to speak, the risk of criminal sanction becomes null with
respect to the compelled testimony. See Garrity, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (state may not use
compelled testimony against witness in subsequent criminal proceedings). Thus, according to
Hale, an employee could not claim that the fifth amendment demands a use immunity
advisement because the fifth amendment ceases to offer protection when no risk of criminal
prosecution exists. Hale, 201 U.S. at 67. Furthermore, in Adams v. Maryland the Supreme
Court noted that a statute conferring immunity protection was unnecessary because the fifth
amendment automatically protects a witness' compelled testimony from use in subsequent
criminal procedings. Adams, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954). Again, the Supreme Court implied that
the use immunity advisement is unnecessary to satisfy the fifth amendment privilege because
the fifth amendment automatically provides use immunity to the public employee's compelled
statements. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (use immunity advisement is not
necessary because coercive acts activate use immunity, making use immunity advisement
superfluous protection).
19. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
20. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).




25. Id. at 495.
26. Id. at 497-98.
27. Id. at 497-500.
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from employment for refusing to answer questions was inherently coercive.28
Thus, the Garrity Court implied that the coercion inherent in a policy that
an employee may forfeit his employment if the employee refuses to answer
the employer's questions automatically will activate use immunity for any
statements the employee makes when questioned under the duress of such
a policy. 29 A state, consequently, cannot use an employee's statements, or
evidence derived from the employee's statements, in a criminal proceeeding
against a public employee when the employer has forced the employee to
testify under the threat of dismissal from employment.30
Building upon its decision in Garrity, the Supreme Court addressed the
question of compelled waiver of immunity in Gardner v. Broderick."' In
Gardner, a grand jury investigating police corruption in New York City
subpoenaed a policeman to testify. 2 The Assistant District Attorney in-
formed the officer of the privilege against self-incrimination but also warned
the employee that if the employee declined to sign a use immunity waiver
form, the City would discharge the employee from the police department.33
The officer refused to sign the waiver, and the City removed the officer
from the police force.
3 4
In reinstating the officer, the Supreme Court held that a public employer
may not dismiss an employee for refusing to waive use immunity from
compelled testimony.3 5 The Gardner Court reasoned that when an employer
insists that an employee surrender use immunity, the employer's desire for
information may not thwart the fifth amendment privilege conferring use
immunity upon compelled testimony.36 Thus, the Supreme Court's decision
in Gardner adhered to the principle enunciated in Garrity that employers
may not use threats of dismissal to compel an employee to testify without
also conferring use immunity to the employee's statements. 7 The Gardner
Court, however, noted that if the employee refused to answer duty-related
questions and the employer did not demand a surrender of use immunity
protection, the employer could discharge the employee.
3 8
28. Id. at 497-98.
29. Id. at 500.
30. Id. at 500.
31. See Gardner, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968) (employer may not dismiss employee for
refusing to waive use immunity from compelled testimony).
32. Id. at 274.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 275.
35. Id. at 279.
36. Id. at 279.
37. See id. Like its decision in Garrity v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court in Gardner
v. Broderick found that a public employer's threat of dismissal directed at a public employee
could not impair the employee's fifth amendment privilege. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 279; see
Garrity, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (state may not use employee's testimony against employee
when public employer has used threat of dismissal to compel employee to give testimony).
38. Gardner, 392 US. at 278; see Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of
Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 285 (1968) (employer may discipline public employee who refuses to
answer duty-related questions if employer does not attempt to compel employee to waive use
immunity); infra text accompanying notes 56-61 (discussing Uniformed Sanitation Men 1).
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By noting that an employer may discipline an employee who has use
immunity for failing to answer duty-related questions, the Supreme Court
set the stage for the controversy over use immunity advisements. Inevitably,
even though an employee has use immunity because his employer has
threatened him with disciplinary action for refusing to answer duty-related
questions, 9 and his employer has not attempted to coerce the employee to
waive immunity protection, a stubborn employee nonetheless will refuse to
answer questions. The hypothetical stubborn employee who refuses to answer
questions will insist that an employee's fifth amendment privilege gives an
employee the right to refuse to answer incriminating questions until the
employer advises the employee that the employee's statements will have use
immunity. Furthermore, the employee will claim that the employer may not
discipline the employee for refusing to answer duty-related questions unless
the employer has given the employee a use immunity advisement.
The inevitable case of the stubborn employee who refuses to answer
questions, despite having use immunity and despite the absence of compul-
sion to waive immunity, arose in Benjamin v. City of Montgomery40 . In
Benjamin, two police officers investigated a shooting of a third police
officer. 4' The State of Alabama indicted several persons as a result of the
shooting incident, and the indictees desired to obtain the testimony of the
two investigating officers. 42 The indictees wanted to show that the police
officers had acted improperly at the time of the shooting incident and
during the subsequent investigation.43 The indictees, therefore, subpoenaed
the two officers.44 At the indictees' preliminary hearing, however, both
officers invoked the fifth amendment and refused to answer questions.
45
The Mayor of Montgomery then ordered the officers to report to the district
attorney and to fully disclose their knowledge about the shooting. 46 The
district attorney, however, refused to take the statements of the officers
because the statements would enjoy use immunity.4 7 The shooting case
proceeded to trial, and the defense once again subpoenaed the officers.
48
The officers refused to answer questions, and the Mayor informed the
officers that if the officers continued to refuse to answer questions, the
Mayor would fire the officers.4 9 Upon recall to the stand, the officers
39. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (coercion inherent in threat of
dismissal for refusing to answer public employer's questions creates use immunity protection
for employee's answers); supra text accompanying notes 21-30 (discussing Garrity).
40. 785 F.2d 959 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 571 (1986).










WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:259
indicated that they would answer questions on the condition that their
statements receive use immunity.50 The trial court refused to extend immunity
to the officers' statements, and the Mayor subsequently discharged the
officers."1
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
found that the Mayor had discharged the officers for refusing to waive the
fifth amendment protection of use immunity.52 The Benjamin court declared
that when the officers refused to testify unless they received an assurance
that their testimony would enjoy use immunity, the employees merely were
refusing to waive immunity.5 3 Finding that the employees had refused to
waive immunity, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's holding
in Gardner and invalidated the discharge of the officers.5 4 Thus, the Ben-
jamin court avoided holding expressly that the fifth amendment requires a
public employer to give a public employee a use immunity advisement before
disciplining the employee for refusing to answer duty-related questions.
Several federal appellate courts, however, require a public employer to
give an employee a use immunity advisement before disciplining the em-
ployee. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pioneered
the advisement requirement in Uniformed Sanitation Men Association v.
Commissioner of Sanitation ( Uniformed Sanitation I)" 5. The case came to
the Second Circuit on the remand from the Supreme Court's decision in
Uniformed Sanitation Men Association v. Commissioner of Sanitation (
Uniformed Sanitation 1)56. The controversy in Uniformed Sanitation I began
when twelve New York City sanitation men refused to testify and to sign
waivers of immunity before an administrative hearing investigating corrup-
tion.57 Three other sanitation men refused to testify and to sign waivers of
immunity at grand jury hearings also investigating corruption.5 8 The City
of New York (City) dismissed all fifteen men solely because they refused
to sign waivers of immunity.5 9 The Supreme Court held that the City's
dismissal of the sanitation men violated the fifth amendment because the
City had disciplined the men merely for asserting and refusing to waive
their fifth amendment rights.60 The Supreme Court noted, however, that a
50. Id. at 962.
51. Id. at 960.
52. Id. at 963.
53. Id. at 962.
54. See id. at 963. A public employer may not dismiss an employee from employment
for refusing to waive the protection of the fifth amendment. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S.
273, 278 (1968); see supra text accompanying notes 31-38 (discussing Gardner).
55. 426 F.2d 619 (2d. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972).
56. 392 U.S. 280 (1968). Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation
(Uniformed Sanitation I) was a companion case to Gardner v. Broderick. Gardner v. Broderick,
392 U.S. 273 (1968); see supra text accompanying notes 31-38 (discussing Gardner).
57. Uniformed Sanitation I, 392 U.S. at 281-82.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 284.
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public employer may dismiss a public employee who refuses to answer
questions concerning the performance of the employee's public trust if the
employer conducts proper proceedings in which an employer does not coerce
an employee to waive the protection of use immunity.
61
After the Supreme Court remanded Uniformed Sanitation I, the City
reinstated the employees and again brought the employees before adminis-
trative hearings for questioning.62 On this occasion, the City fully advised
the employees of their rights and advised the employees that the employees
would not surrender their use immunity by answering questions.6 3 Once
again, the employees refused to answer questions and the City dismissed
the employees from employment. 4 Upholding the district court's decision,
the Second Circuit found that the dismissal of the sanitation men was
proper.65 In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit interpreted the Supreme
Court's opinion in Uniformed Sanitation L 66 In Uniformed Sanitation I,
the Supreme Court had noted that in addition to requiring an employer to
restrict his questions to duty-related matters and to refrain from coercing
waiver of use immunity, the employer must conduct proper proceedings
before disciplining an employee. 67 The Second Circuit found that the proper
proceedings that an employer must provide to an employee involve advising
the employee of the status of the employee's use immunity before disciplining
the employee.6 1 The Second Circuit, therefore, held that the City could fire
the sanitation men because the employer properly had advised the employees
before disciplining them.69
61. Id. at 285.
62. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 621
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972).
63. See Id. In Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation (Uni-
formed Sanitation II), the City of New York gave its employees the following advisement
before city officials questioned the employees:
I want to advise you, Mr ... , that you have all the rights and privileges
guaranteed by the Laws of the State of New York and the Constitution of this State
and of the United States, including the right to be represented by counsel at this
inquiry, the right to remain silent, although you may be subject to disciplinary action
by the Department of Sanitation for the failure to answer material and relevant
questions relating to the performance of your duties as an employee of the City of
New York.
I further advise you that the answers you may give to the questions propounded
to you at this proceeding, or any information or evidence which is gained by reason
of your answers, may not be used against you in a criminal proceeding except that
you may be subject to criminal prosecution for any false answer that you may give
under any applicable law, including Section 1121 of the New York City Charter.
Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 626.
66. Id. at 627.
67. Uniformed Sanitation I, 392 U.S. 280, 285 (1968).
68. Uniformed Sanitation II, 426 F.2d at 627.
69. Id.; see Weston v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 724 F.2d 943,
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The use immunity advisement also has become part of fifth amendment
law governing employer-employee relations in the Seventh Circuit as a result
of the decision in Confederation of Police v. Conlisk.70 In Conlisk, six
Chicago police officers invoked the protection of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination at federal grand jury hearings investigat-
ing police corruption.7' The Internal Affairs Department of the Chicago
Police Department (Department) subsequently questioned each officer, ask-
ing only whether the officer had invoked the fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination at the grand jury hearings.72 The City
of Chicago subsequently dismissed the officers from employment because
the officers had exercised the fifth amendment right to remain silent at the
grand jury proceeding.
73
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that the spirit of the Supreme Court's holdings in Gardner and Uniformed
Sanitation I indicated that an employer may dismiss an employee for refusing
to respond to an employer's questions only when the employer has asked
duty-related questions and has advised the employee that the employee's
answers will have use immunity.74 The Conlisk court found that the De-
948 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In Weston v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the discharge of
a public employee for refusing to answer duty-related questions. Id. at 948. The Federal Circuit
considered significant the fact that the employer sufficiently had advised the employee that
the employee's statements would enjoy use immunity and noted that the fifth amendment
demanded an use immunity advisement before disciplining the employee. Id.; see Lemoine v.
Department of Police, 301 So.2d 396, 400 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (because police department
gave officers use immunity advisement, state could fire officers for refusing to answer questions
about bribery); Seattle Police Officers' Guild v. City of Seattle, 80 Wash.2d 307, 494 P.2d
485, 491 (1972) (police department could discharge officer for failing to answer duty-related
questions when department gave officer use immunity advisement).
70. 489 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974).
71. Id. at 892.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 894; see United States v. Devitt, 499 F.2d 135, 141 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing
Conlisk with approval, but holding that lack of advisement is not defense against use of
compelled statements when employee committed perjury), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975);
D'Acquisto v. Washington, 640 F. Supp. 594, 624 (N.D. I11. 1986) (fifth amendment demands
use immunity statement before employer can take disciplinary action for employee's failure to
answer duty-related questions); Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555, 560 (M.D.N.C. 1978)
(police department must give use immunity advisement before disciplining employee for refusing
to answer questions, but fifth amendment will not protect employee who commits perjury to
avoid self-incrimination); McLean v. Rochford, 404 F. Supp. 191, 198 (N.D. I11. 1975)
(employee must have affirmative assurance of use immunity before employer may demand
answers to duty-related questions); Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1102 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
(government employer can coerce answers to duty-related questions if employer gives adequate
assurances to employee that responses have use immunity); Kalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d
1391 ( Ct. Cl. 1973). In Kalkines v. United States, the United States Court of Claims directly
addressed the issue of the advisement requirement and decided in favor of the requirement.
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partment had complied with neither the duty-related question requirement
nor the use immunity advisement requirement. 7 The Department had failed
to comply with these requirements because the Department had given no
use immunity advisement and because the Department's inquiry concerning
Kalkines, 473 F.2d at 1393. An employee of the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury (Bureau)
was under investigation for taking cash from an importer desiring favorable customs treatment.
Id. at 1392. On four different occasions, the employee refused to answer questions posed by
investigators for the Bureau regarding a deposit of cash that the employee had made, his
finances, and the performance of his customs duties. Id. In addition to the Bureau's investi-
gation, the employee also was the subject of an United States Attorney's Office inquiry into
the same matter. Id. At each of the first three Bureau inquiries, the Bureau agents did not
advise the employee of the operation of use immunity upon the employee's compelled
statements, and at the last session the Customs agents told the employee that the state would
not use the employee's statements against him in subsequent criminal proceedings. Id. at 1395-
96. The United States Attorney's Office never indicted the employee. Id. at 1392. The Bureau,
however, discharged the employee from employment for refusing to answer questions relating
to the performance of his official duties. Id.
The Court of Claims interpreted the Supreme Court's holdings in Gardner v. Broderick
and Uniformed Sanitation I to require an employer to advise a public employee that the
employer might remove the employee from office for failing to answer duty-related questions
and to inform the employee that his compelled statements had use immunity. Id. at 1393; see
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968) (employer may not discipline employee for
refusing to waive use immunity protection); Uniformed Sanitation I, 392 U.S. 280, 284 (1968)
(same). The absense or inadequacy of the advisements that the Bureau agents gave to the
employee was the sole basis for the Court of Claims' ruling that the employee's dismissal was
invalid. Kalkines, 473 F.2d at 1394. The Kalkines court reasoned that the employee was
justified in the fear that, absent a proper advisement, the employer might use the employee's
statements in subsequent criminal proceedings. Id. Because the employee's fear was reasonable,
the employee's refusal to answer questions on fifth amendment grounds also was justified. Id.
The Court of Claims also considered unreasonable any expectation that the employee would
be knowledgeable concerning the Supreme Court's holdings in Garrity v. New Jersey, Gardner
v. Broderick, and Uniformed Sanitation L Id. at 1394. See Garrity,385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967)
(public employee's compelled testimony is inadmissable against employee in subsequent criminal
proceeding); Gardner, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968) (public employer may not discipline employee
for refusing to waive use immunity protection); Uniformed Sanitation 1, 392 U.S. 280, 284
(1968) (same); supra text accompanying notes 21-30 (discussing Garrity); supra text accompa-
nying notes 31-38 (discussing Gardner); supra text accompanying notes 56-61 (discussing
Uniformed Sanitation 1). The Kalkines court noted that because the employer could not expect
the employee to know that the employee's compelled statements would enjoy use immunity,
the employee was justified in refusing to answer questions. Kalkines, 473 F.2d at 1362.
In Banca v. Town of Phillipsburg, the Superior Court of New Jersey offered a rationale
for requiring the use immunity advisement similar to the Court of Claims' rationale in Kalkines.
See Banca v. Town of Phillipsburg, 181 N.J. Super. 109, 115-16, 436 A.2d 944, 948 (1981).
The Banca court declared that satisfaction of the fifth amendment privilege could not depend
upon the questionable assumption that the employee knew or should have known that his
compelled statements had use immunity. Id. The Banca court noted that in light of the evolving
nature of fifth amendment law, charging a public employee with knowledge of the detailed
interpretations of an employee's right against compelled self-incrimination was unreasonable.
Id; see Marsh v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 64 Ohio App. 2d 151, 157, 411 N.E.2d 803, 807 (1977)
(failure to give immunity advisement to firemen discharged for refusing to answer questions
about false alarm incident is sole ground for invalidating dismissals).
75. Conlisk, 489 F.2d at 895.
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whether the officers had invoked the fifth amendment privilege at the grand
jury hearings did not constitute duty-related questioning.7 6 The Seventh
Circuit, therefore, invalidated the officers' dismissals.
7 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however,
examined the use immunity advisement requirement in Gulden v. McCorkle7m
and refused to impose upon employers the duty to give the use immunity
advisement. In Gulden, the Dallas Public Works Department (Department)
suspected two Department employees of telephoning a bomb threat into the
Department. 9 Two days after the threat, the Department directed all em-
ployees to submit to a polygraph examination and to sign waivers consenting
to the administration of the polygraph examination. 0 The Department
informed the employees that the polygraph examination was for the sole
purpose of investigating the bomb threat." The two supected employees
refused to sign the waivers and refused to submit to the polygraph exami-
nation on the ground that the waivers would indicate that the the employees
voluntarily had submitted to the polygraph examination when the suspected
employees' participation clearly would not be voluntary.12 The employees
argued that the Department's use of the waivers violated the employees'
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.8 3 The Department placed
the employees on administrative leave and ordered the employees to report
to the Dallas Police Department for polygraph examinations.8 The Police
Department investigators demanded that the employees sign waivers stating
76. See id. at 895. In Confederation of Police v. Conlisk, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the Chicago Police Department (Department) failed
to satisfy the duty-related question requirement because the Department had asked the police-
men only whether they had invoked their fifth amendment privilege at the grand jury
proceeding. Id. The Seventh Circuit's decision, however, is mistaken because the court failed
to consider the nature of the questions that the Department asked at the grand jury hearing.
The grand jury questions dealt with police corruption. Id. at 892. The grand jury questions,
therefore, clearly were duty-related.
The Department also failed to satisfy the advisement requirement because the Department
had not informed the officers that the officer's compelled testimony would have the benefit
of use immunity. Id. at 895. The Conlisk court held that the Department did not satisfy the
advisement requirement despite the assertion by the Department that the Department and its
agents did not have the authority to grant immunity to the officers. Id. The Conlisk court
responded that the Department need not have formal authority to grant immunity. Id. The
immunity automatically arose because the Department asked officers to testify on threat of
dismissal. Id. at 895; see Garrity, 385 U.S. 493, 499 (1967) (holding use immunity applies to
any testimony that public employee gives under threat of dismissal); supra text accompanying
notes 21-30 (discussing Garrity).
77. Conlisk, 489 F.2d at 895.
78. Gulden v. McCorkle, 680 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206
(1983).




83. Id. at 1072.
84. Id.
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that the employees voluntarily submitted to the polygraph, and once again
the employees refused to sign the waivers or submit to the examination."'
Five days later, the Department discharged the employees, while in the
interim the district court had denied the employee's request for injunctive
relief from threatened discharge by the Department.
8 6
In Gulden, the Fifth Circuit focused on the fact that the Department
had not demanded that the employees relinquish fifth amendment rights on
threat of dismissal.8 7 The Gulden court refused to accept the employees'
contention that by failing to tender a use immunity advisement to the
employees, the Department compelled the employees to waive immunity."
The Fifth Circuit rejected the employees' assertion that Gardner and Uni-
formed Sanitation I supported a use immunity advisement. 9 The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that the Department had not forced the employees to waive
the immunity that, under Garrity, automatically attached to their compelled
testimony 0
In addition to finding that the use immunity advisement was unnecessary
because the absence of the advisement did not force the employees to
surrender use immunity protection, the Gulden court noted that the De-
partment had no obligation to offer the employees a use immunity advise-
ment because the Department had not yet asked the employees any questions.9'
Thus, the Fifth Circuit distinquished Gulden from prior cases in which the
Seventh Circuit upheld the necessity of a use immunity advisement.9 2 The
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1074.
88. Id. at 1075.
89. Id.; see Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968) (employer may not discipline
employee for refusing to waive use immunity protection); Uniformed Sanitation I, 392 U.S.
280, 284 (1968) (same); supra text accompanying notes 31-38 (discussing Gardner); supra text
accompanying notes 56-61 (discussing Uniformed Sanitation 1).
90. Gulden, 680 F.2d at 1075. Several federal and state courts expressly have rejected
the use immunity advisement requirement. See Erwin v. Price, 778 F.2d 668, 670 (lth Cir.
1985) (use immunity advisements are superfluous and unnecessary because use immunity
attaches to compelled testimony as a matter of law); Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d
1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1985) (use immunity advisement is not necessary before discharging
employee for refusing to answer duty-related questions because use immunity automatically
attaches to compelled testimony); Womer v. Hampton 496 F.2d 99, 108 (5th Cir. 1974) (lack
of immunity advisement was not prejudicial to employee's interests in administrative hearing
investigating public contractor kickbacks); DeWalt v. Barger, 490 F. Supp. 1262, 1272 (M.D.
Pa. 1980) (dismissal of employee for refusing to answer duty-related questions was proper
despite lack of use immunity advisement); Pinkney v. District of Columbia, 439 F. Supp. 519,
534 (D.D.C. 1977) (discharge of employee for failing to answer questions concerning pending
criminal charges was proper, even absent use immunity advisement).
91. Gulden, 680 F.2d at 1075-76.
92. See id. at 1075. In Gulden v. McCorke, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit noted that United States v. Devitt and Confederation of Police v. Conlisk
involved investigations in which the employer had asked the employee questions, and the
employee had refused to answer on fifth amendment grounds. Id. In Gulden, however, the
Dallas Public Works Department had not asked the employees any direct questions because
1987]
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Gulden court reasoned that because the Department had not asked any
questions before the employees asserted their fifth amendment privilege, the
employees' claim of their fifth amendment right was premature. 93 The Fifth
Circuit, however, narrowed its holding by expressly declining to state
whether at some stage in the investigation a use immunity advisement might
be constitutionally necessary. 94 The Gulden court, nevertheless, firmly stated
that before an employer demands answers to specific questions, the advise-
ment is not necessary. 95 The Fifth Circuit found that the Department's
discharge of the employees did not violate the fifth amendment. 96 Thus, the
the employees had refused to appear for the polygraph examination. Id. at 1075-76. The
Seventh Circuit thus distinguished Gulden from Devitt and Conlisk. Id. at 1075; see United
States v. Devitt, 499 F.2d 135, 141 (7th Cir. 1974) (requiring use immunity advisement, but
holding that lack of advisement is not defense against use of compelled statements when
employee committed perjury); Confederation of Police v. Conlisk, 489 F.2d 891, 894 (7th Cir.
1973) (requiring use immunity advisement before disciplining public employee for refusing to
answer duty-related questions), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974); supra text accompanying
notes 70-77 (discussing Conlisk).
93. Gulden, 680 F.2d at 1075.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1076.
96. Id. at 1076. Several federal appellate courts have refused to allow a public employee
to avoid or postpone an investigative interview by asserting the fifth amendment privilege. See
Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578, 582 (5th Cir. 1982) (police officer could not obtain
postponement of administrative hearing while criminal charges against him were pending,
despite asserting his fifth amendment privilege); Diebold v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 611 F.2d
697, 801 (8th Cir. 1979) (employee could not postpone administrative proceeding while criminal
charges against him were pending, despite asserting his fifth amendment privilege and despite
employee's fear that according to Civil Service Commission regulation, employer might
discharge employee for refusing to answer questions); De Vita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172, 1177-
78 (3d Cir. 1970) (state's refusal to stay judicial inquiry into attorney misconduct pending
outcome of criminal proceeding did not violate fifth amendment, but no policy of disbarment
for refusing to answer questions existed); Luman v. Tanzler, 411 F.2d 164, 167 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 929 (1969) (policeman denied continuance of administrative inquiry
pending outcome of criminal proceedings despite assertion of fifth amendment privilege and
despite police department rule that police department may dismiss employee for refusing to
answer duty-related questions). In Diebold v. Civil Service Comm'n, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit implied that no use immunity advisement is necessary before
disciplining an employee for refusing to answer duty-related questions. Diebold, 611 F.2d at
701. In Luman v. Tanzler, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also
implied that no use immunity advisement is necessary before disciplining an employee for
refusing to answer duty-related questions. Luman, 411 F.2d at 167. Both the Luman and
Diebold courts suggest that the fifth amendment does not require a use immunity advisement
because essentially no difference exists between an employee who asserts the fifth amendment
privilege and refuses to answer questions and an employee who asserts the fifth amendment
and refuses to appear for an investigative interview. When, as in both Diebold and Luman,
the employer has a policy of dismissing employees for refusing to answer questions, the
employee who refuses to answer questions is in the same position with respect to use immunity
and the risk of discharge as an employee who refuses to appear at the investigative interview.
See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (coercion inherent in dismissal policy for
refusal to answer questions activates use immunity for employee's testimony); Diebold, 611
F.2d at 701 (employer had policy of dismissing employees for refusing to answer duty-related
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Gulden court implied that an employer may discipline an employee who
refuses to answer duty-related questions despite the employer's failure to
inform the employee that, because of the coercion inherent in the employer's
threat of dismissal, the employee's statements would enjoy use immunity.
97
In Hester v. City of Milledgeville,98 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit closely paralleled the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit
in Gulden. In Hester, the City of Milledgeville (City) required all city
firemen to take polygraph examinations because city officials suspected that
firemen were involved in illegal drug activity. 99 Prior to testing, the City
demanded that all employees sign one of four waivers, two of which
indicated that the employee gave up his fifth amendment protection from
the use of compelled statements against the employee in a criminal pro-
ceeding. 100 The City never conducted the polygraph examinations because
the employees obtained an injunction from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia enjoining the City from proceeding with
the examinations.u0 The district court held that the City could not compel
the employees to submit to a polygraph examination without affirmatively
extending use immunity to the firemen's statements. 10 2
The Eleventh Circuit found that the City violated the fifth amendment
when the City insisted that the firemen sign one of four waiver forms, two
of which relinquished the fifth amendment immunity from the use of
compelled statements. 03 The Hester court declared that using waiver forms
subtly would coerce the employee to sign the forms most generous to the
employer's desire for information.' ° Thus, the employer would coerce the
employees to sign forms waiving the attachment of use immunity to the
employees' compelled testimony.'0 5 Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit found
that the use of the waivers violated the fifth amendment."06
The Hester court, however, reversed the district court's decision that
the fifth amendment required that the City provide a use immunity advise-
ment. 0 7 The Eleventh Circuit found that any grant of use immunity by the
questions); Luman, 411 F.2d at 167 (same); supra text accompanying notes 21-30 (discussing
Garrity). Therefore, when an employer has a policy that the employer may dismiss an employee
who refuses to answer duty-related questions, if a court allows the employer to dismiss an
employee who asserts the fifth amendment privilege and refuses to attend an investigative
interview, the court's decision implies that the use immunity advisement is not necessary before
the employer disciplines the employee.
97. Gulden, 680 F.2d at 1075-76.
98. 777 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985).
99. Id. at 1494.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 598 F. Supp. 1456 (M.D. Ga. 1984).
103. Hester, 777 F.2d at 1495.
104. Id. at 1495-96.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1496.
107. Id.
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City was superfluous because, under Garrity, the fifth amendment auto-
matically extends use immunity to any compelled incriminating testimony. 0s
The Hester court concluded that the use immunity advisement was unnec-
essary because the advisement would have no legal effect on the existence
of use immunity. '0
The Eleventh Circuit in Hester and other federal and state courts that
have addressed the use immunity advisement based their opinions on weak
rationales with little precedential support." 0 Examination of the use im-
munity advisement issue from a fresh perspective, however, leads to the
conclusion that the use immunity advisement is necessary. Unfortunately,
the opinions of federal appellate courts that hold in favor of the use
immunity advisement do not provide persuasive reasoning. The Second
Circuit in Uniformed Sanitation 11 and the Seventh Circuit in Conlisk base
their findings in favor of the use immunity advisement upon liberal inter-
pretations of the Supreme Court's holdings in Garrity, Gardner, and Uni-
formed Sanitation I."' The circuit court holdings that require the advisement
are unsupported extensions of Supreme Court doctrine." 2 The Second Circuit
and the Seventh Circuit have created the advisement requirement to remedy
problems in implementing the provision that an employer may discipline
public employees who have use immunity protection for failing to answer
duty-related questions.113 A basic sense of fairness apparently is the only
rationale behind the opinions in favor of the use immunity advisement. The
rationale behind the Court of Claims' decision in Kalkines v. United States"1
4
provides the most persuasive basis for approving the use immunity advise-
ment. The Court of Claims in Kalkines reasoned that an employee justifiably
may remain silent in the face of duty-related questions and threats of
108. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 21-30 (discussing Garrity).
109. Hester, 777 F.2d at 1496.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 55-77 (discussing cases holding in favor of use
immunity advisement); supra text accompanying notes 78-109 (discussing cases rejecting use
immunity advisement).
111. See Confederation of Police v. Conlisk, 489 F.2d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding
in favor of use immunity advisement based upon interpretation of Gardner and Uniformed
Sanitation 1), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974); Uniformed Sanitation 11, 426 F.2d 619, 627
(2d Cir. 1970) (holding in favor of use immunity advisement based upon interpretation of
Uniformed Sanitation 1), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972); supra text accompanying notes
70-77 (discussing Conlisk); supra text accompanying notes 56-61 (discussing Uniformed Sani-
tation 1).
112. See Jones, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination of the Public Employee in an
Investigative Interview, ARmy LAW., Nov. 1985 at 6, 10 (use immunity advisement requirement
based on spirit of Supreme Court decisions in Garrity, Gardner and Uniformed Sanitation I
is arbitrary and speculative).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 55-77 (discussing Seventh Circuit and Second
Circuit holdings in favor of use immunity advisement).
114. See Kalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391, 1395 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (holding in favor
of use immunity advisement requirement); Banca v. Town of Phillipsburg, 181 N.J. Super.
109, 115-16, 436 A.2d 944, 948 (1981) (same); supra note 74 (discussing Kalkines and Banca).
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dismissal."' An employee justifiably may refuse to answer questions because
he most likely does not know, nor should the employer expect the employee
to know, that the employer's threats of dismissal are coercive and, therefore,
that the employee has use immunity protection." 6 The federal and state
courts that endorse the advisement appear to be searching for a forceful
rationale for the requirement of a use immunity advisement.
In contrast to the pro-advisement courts, the federal and state courts
that do not require a use immunity advisement requirement are not searching
for a rationale to support their decisions. These federal and state courts
continually recite that, because use immunity automatically arises when an
empl6 yer threatens to discipline an employee for refusing to answer ques-
tions, an employer has no duty to advise an employee that the employee
has use immunity protection.1" 7 Federal appellate court opinions that do not
require the use immunity advisement, however, are flawed and do not
provide a compelling justification for rejecting the advisement. The Eleventh
Circuit's position on the advisement requirement in Hester is incongruous
with the Hester court's stance on the City's use of waiver forms.11s In
Hester, the Eleventh Circuit held that the employer's use of waiver forms
to help clarify the employee's position regarding an assertion of the fifth
amendment privilege was not proper." 9 The Hester court also found that
an employee was not entitled to a use immunity advisement before the
employer disciplines the employee for refusing to answer duty-related ques-
tions. 20 The Eleventh Circuit prefers that both the public employer and the
employee enter an investigative interview with neither the employer nor the
employee informed about their options or obligations. To illustrate, under
Hester, an employer will not have an opportunity to discover which em-
ployees truly wish to submit to questioning on a voluntary basis because
any attempt to identify volunteers via consent forms is improper.'2 ' Fur-
115. See Kalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391, 1395 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (holding in favor
of use immunity advisement requirement); Banca v. Town of Phillipsburg, 181 N.J. Super.
109, 115-16, 436 A.2d 944, 948 (1981) (same); supra note 74 (discussing Kalkines and Banca).
116. Id.; see Banca v. Town of Phillipsburg, 181 N.J. Super. 109, 115-16, 436 A.2d 944,
948 (1981) (requiring use immunity advisement because employer should not expect employee
to know that use immunity automatically attaches to compelled testimony); supra note 74
(discussing Banca).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 78-109 (discussing cases finding use immunity
advisement unnecessary).
118. See Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1495-96 (11th Cir. 1985) (use of
waiver forms by employer subtly coerces employee to waive immunity and, therefore, is
improper); supra text accompanying notes 103-06 (discussing Hester court findings regarding
employer's use of waiver forms).
119. See Hester, 777 F.2d at 1495-96 (use of waiver forms by employer subtly coerces
employee to waive immunity and, therefore, is improper); supra text accompanying notes 103-
06 (discussing Hester court findings regarding employer's use of waiver forms).
120. See Hester, 777 F.2d at 1496 (use immunity advisement not necessary before disci-
plining public employee for refusing to answer duty-related questions); supra text accompanying
notes 103-09 (discussing Hester).
121. See Hester, 777 F.2d at 1495-96 (use of waiver forms by employer subtly coerces
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thermore, an employee enters the interview, in which the employee may be
under the obligation to answer incriminatory questions, knowing only that
the employer has ordered the employee to answer questions. The employee
knows nothing about the consequences of the employer's order. The Hester
court, therefore, unwittingly endorsed an investigative interview in which
both the employer and the employee are ignorant of each other's intentions
and the consequences of each other's options. 2 2 The Hester court's reason-
ing, therefore, leads to an unsatisfactory conclusion.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Gulden v. McCorkle also is flawed.
23
The Gulden court ruled that the employees prematurely asserted their fifth
amendment rights because the employees claimed the privilege against self-
incrimination before the Department had asked any specific questions.
24
The Fifth Circuit's contention that the Department's announcement that
the Department would administer a polygraph examination for the sole
purpose of investigating a bomb threat did not frame the questions to which
the Department sought answers is untenable. In essence, the Department
posed the crucial questions to the employees when the Department an-
nounced that the polygraph examination was part of a Department inves-
tigation of a bomb threat.125 The employees, therefore, justifiably asserted
their fifth amendment rights at the time the Department requested that the
employees submit to the polygraph examination.
126
The Gulden court also found that the Department had not asked the
employees to waive any fifth amendment protection when the Department
ordered the employees to sign waivers indicating that the employee volun-
tarily submitted to the polygraph examination. 127 The Gulden court's holding
concerning the employer's use of waiver forms also is unacceptable. An
employer cannot expect an employee to sign a statement indicating that the
employee voluntarily submitted to a polygraph examination when the Su-
preme Court firmly has established that the fifth amendment does not
extend immunity to voluntary statements. 28 An employer cannot compel an
employee to waive immunity and, therefore, is improper); supra text accompanying notes 103-
06 (discussing Hester court findings regarding employer's use of waiver forms).
122. See Hester, 777 F.2d at 1495-96 (employer's use of waiver forms is improper and
use immunity advisement is unnecessary); supra text accompanying notes 103-09 (discussing
Hester).
123. See Gulden v. McCorkle, 680 F.2d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting use immunity
advisement requirement), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983); supra text accompanying notes
78-97 (discussing Gulden).
124. Gulden, 680 F.2d at 1076.
125. Id. at 1071.
126. See Uniformed Sanitation 1, 392 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1968). Once an employer poses
incriminating questions, an employee has a right to make a valid assertion of the fifth
amendment privilege with respect to that subject. Id.
127. Gulden, 680 F.2d at 1074.
128. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 499 (1967) (fifth amendment immunity
does not extend to voluntary testimony). Voluntary testimony is not compelled testimony and
is not subject to the protection of the fifth amendment privilege. See Garner v. United States,
424 U.S. 648, 654 (1976) (fifth amendment does not preclude use of voluntary testimony
against witness in subsequent criminal proceeding).
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employee to make an assertion by signing a waiver when the assertion is
not the employee's true position. 29
The unpersuasive opinions in favor of the use immunity advisement 30 ,
and the flawed and inconsistent opinions against the use immunity
advisement 3' have created confusion in fifth amendment law.32 Courts
should support the use immunity advisement with a rationale that is not
based exclusively on subjective notions of fairness but also upon logical
analysis of factual situations. An analysis of the facts of Benjamin v. City
of Montgomery' logically leads to the conclusion that an employer always
should give an employee a use immunity advisement before the employer
may discipline the employee for refusing to answer duty-related questions.
In Benjamin, when the defense called the officers to the witness stand
for the second time, the Mayor of Montgomery had warned the officers
that if the officers did not testify about the investigation of the shooting
incident, the Mayor would fire the officers. 3 4 At this point, the Mayor had
attempted to secure the officers' testimony through coercion. 35 Thus, under
Garrity, if the officers had answered questions, their answers would have
enjoyed use immunity.136 Furthermore, the questions about the officers'
investigation of the shooting incident undoubtedly were duty-related ques-
tions. 3 7 Consequently, according to the rationale of federal and state courts
holding that the use immunity advisement is unnecessary, the Mayor of
Montgomery properly could have discharged the officers for refusing to
answer questions relating to the employees' official duties. 38 The officers
in Benjamin, however, created a dilemma for courts interpreting fifth
amendment law governing the public employee's assertion of the privilege
against self-incrimination. The employees in Benjamin asserted their fifth
129. See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968). In Gardner v. Broderick, the
Supreme Court asserted that an employee could not assume, and an employer should not
expect an employee to assume, that signing a waiver form is an idle act of no legal effect.
Id. The Gardner Court also noted that the privilege against self-incrimination does not allow
any effort, whether effective or ineffective, to coerce a waiver of immunity. Id.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 111-16 (discussing weakness of rationale for
decisions in favor of use immunity advisement).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 117-129 (discussing flaws in decisions against use
immunity advisement).
132. See Jones, supra note 112, at 15 (urging Supreme Court to resolve question of
whether employer must give use immunity advisement before disciplining employee for refusing
to answer duty-related questions).
133. 785 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1986).
134. Benjamin, 785 F.2d at 960, 962; see supra text accompanying notes 40-51 (discussing
Benjamin factual background).
135. Benjamin, 785 F.2d at 962.
136. See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500 (1967) (employee's compelled testimony, and fruits of
compelled testimony, are not admissable as evidence in criminal proceeding against employee).
137. See supra note 13 (discussing definition of "duty-related" questions).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 78-109 (discussing cases holding that when use
immunity automatically arises from coercion, use immunity advisements are unnecessary because
advisements do not offer additional immunity protection to witness).
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amendment rights by declaring that they refused to testify unless their
statements had use immunity protection. 3 9 The employees' demand for use
immunity protection for their compelled statements was a converse, but
nonetheless valid, assertion of the fifth amendment privilege.14 Furthermore,
demanding use immunity is substantively the same as refusing to answer
questions on the ground that the answers may be self-incriminating. 14 Both
the demand for use immunity and the general assertion that the employee
refuses to answer questions on fifth amendment grounds are invocations of
the fifth amendment right. 42 If, after the Mayor's threat of dismissal, the
officers had refused to answer questions on a general claim of the fifth
amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, the Eleventh Circuit,
based upon its prior opinion in Hester holding against the use immunity
advisement 43 , logically would have concluded that the Mayor properly could
discharge the officers. 44
The employees' demand that their compelled testimony receive use
immunity presented the employer with a dilemma. In light of existing fifth
amendment law, the employer had two options. The employer could inform
the employees that the employees' answers to questions would receive. use
immunity,' 4s or the employer could permit the employees to remain silent
without the employee risking disciplinary action. The employer, therefore,
could not compel the testimony of the employees on duty-related matters
unless the employer gave the employee a use immunity advisement.
An analysis of the facts of Benjamin ultimately leads to the conclusion
that an employer always should give a use immunity advisement before
disciplining an employee for failing to answer duty-related questions. In
asserting their fifth amendment rights by refusing to testify unless their
compelled testimony received use immunity, the employees in Benjamin
139. Benjamin, 785 F.2d at 962.
140. See Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1985). To assert
that the government cannot compel a witness to give testimony that the government can use
against the witness in a criminal proceeding is to assert that the government cannot use any
testimony that government compels a witness to give against a witness in a criminal proceeding.
Id; see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) (fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination naturally encompasses rule that government cannot use
witness' compelled testimony against witness in subsequent criminal proceeding).
141. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (employee's demand for use immunity
before answering questions has identical legal effect as refusing to answer questions on general
assertion of fifth amendment privilege).
142. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (witness may invoke fifth amendment
privilege by demanding immunity before answering incriminating questions).
143. See Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1985).
144. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that when
use immunity automatically arises from coercion, employer may dismiss employee for refusing
to answer duty-related questions despite employee's assertion of fifth amendment privilege).
145. See Garrity, 385 U.S. 493, at 500. Under the Supreme Court's holding in Garrity v.
New Jersey, compelled testimony receives use immunity whether or not an employer gives an
employee a use immunity advisement. Id.
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avoided discharge from employment.146 If the employees had asserted their
fifth amendment rights by refusing to testify on the ground that the fifth
amendment protected them from compelled self-incrimination, the employees
would not have avoided dismissal from their employment. 147 A general
assertion of the fifth amendment privilege would not have protected the
employees from discharge in the same way that an assertion of the fifth
amendment via a demand for use immunity protection would have. Whether
a public employer may fire an employee for refusing to answer questions
relating to the performance of the employee's official duties should not
depend on the words and manner the employee uses to invoke the fifth
amendment privilege. Courts, therefore, should require that an employer
give an employee a use immunity advisement similar to the advisement that
the employer gave to the employees in Uniformed Sanitation 148 before an
employer may discipline an employee for refusing to answer duty-related
questions.
The use immunity advisement will treat equally all employees who assert
the fifth amendment privilege without regard to the manner in which an
employee chooses to assert the privilege. The use immunity advisement will
have no effect on an employer's ability to obtain information on duty-
related matters and will protect an employee with very little inconvenience
to the employer. Furthermore, a use immunity advisement requirement will
promote the efficiency of the investigative interview of the employee because
the employee will understand the consequences of his decision to answer
questions or remain silent.
WILLIAM W. SENFr
146. Benjamin, 785 F.2d at 963.
147. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that, when
use immunity automatically arises from coercion, employer may dismiss employee for refusing
to answer duty-related questions, despite employee's assertion of fifth amendment privilege).
148. See supra note 63 (text of use immunity advisement given to public employees in
Uniformed Sanitation I).
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